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Abstract 
In open source software development, users rather than paid developers engage in 
innovation  and  development  without  the  direct  involvement  of  manufacturers.  This 
paradigm cannot be explained by the two traditional models of innovation, the private 
investment model and the collective action model. Neither model in itself can explain the 
phenomenon of the open source model or its success. In order to bridge the gap between 
existing models and the open source phenomenon, we analyze data from a web survey of 
160 open source developers. First, we investigate the motives affecting the individual 
developer’s  contributions  by  comparing  and  contrasting  the  incentives  from  both  the 
traditional private investment and collective action models. Second, we demonstrate that 
there  is  a  common  ground  between  the  private  and  collective  models  where  private 
returns and social considerations can coexist. Third, we explore the effect of incentives 
on  the  output  of  innovation—final  product  performance.  The  results  show  that  the 
motivations  for  individual  developer’s  contributions  are  quite  different  from  the 
incentives that affect product performance. 
 
 
Keywords: Open Source Software, Incentives, Altruism, Developers’ Contributions, 
Software Performance  1 
Business may be imitating life as industries increasingly organize themselves into 
ecosystems. The ultimate form this evolution may take is the “open source” model 
of the software industry, in which communities of innovators contribute ideas and 
build on them beyond the boundaries of any corporate structure… No matter how 
big, no one company can match the energy and creativity of all those developers 
out there.  
Business Week, April 2001 
 
1. Introduction 
Open  source  software  development  is  a  unique  form  of  innovation.  The 
developers—especially users—engage in innovation, development and consumption of a 
product without the direct involvement of manufacturers (von Hippel 2001). Developers 
are not directly paid for their efforts and the resulting code is disseminated freely, which 
makes  the  extraction  of  private  returns  a  challenge.  The  open  source  software 
development model has drawn significant attention and generated much excitement in the 
business world and the developer community in recent years. Unlike many aspects of the 
rapidly  changing  landscape  of  information  technology,  open  source  development  has 
emerged from the rubble of the Internet Bust stronger and more prominent. Along with 
Apache  server  software,  the  Perl  language,  sendmail,  GNU  and  Linux  have  become 
pervasive in the corporate world. With the increasing number of open source projects and 
the growing importance of the open source movement, it is clear that this development 
paradigm is here to stay. 
Although many open source projects are touted as great success stories, the open 
source  phenomenon  presents  a  difficult  modeling  task  for  both  researchers  and 
practitioners. First, it involves voluntary contributions by software developers without 
direct monetary incentives.  “Why should thousands of top-notch programmers contribute 
freely to the provision of a public good” (Lerner and Tirole 2002, p.198)? Second, the 
assumptions  and  constraints  of  the  two  traditional  innovation  models  –  the  private 
investment model and collective action model— cannot be examined in separately from 
each other (von Hippel and von Krogh 2003). In the private investment model, private 
returns are the key to production and innovation, so the source code is kept closed. In 
open source development, it is freely shared, and so private returns to manufacturers as 
well as to programmers must be obtained via less direct routes.  In the collective action 
model, social considerations are critical but such considerations typically dissipate with   2 
larger  group  sizes  and  free  riding  “Is  there  a  common  ground  between  these  two 
innovation models where the incentives can coexist” (von Hippel and von Krogh 2003, p. 
11)? Third, the effect of various incentives on the output of innovation remains unknown. 
Do different motives lead to improved performance of open source products? Is there a 
significant  difference  between  the  effects  of  incentives  on  contributions  vis-à-vis  the 
effect of incentives on product performance? These issues are crucial and will determine 
the viability of the open source model in the long run. 
The objective of this study is to empirically examine the three distinct yet related 
issues outlined above. First, we explore the incentive structures that affect an individual 
developer’s  contributions  by  comparing  and  contrasting  the  incentives  from  the 
traditional models of innovation. For the private investment model of innovation, we 
examine direct and indirect monetary incentives, such as job prospects, promotions and 
salary increases, as well as non-pecuniary motives, such as ego gratification and self-
fulfillment.  Lerner  and  Tirole  (2002)  argue  that  these  “selfish”  incentives  are  strong 
drivers  of  open  source  development.  For  the  collective  action  model,  we  examine 
whether perceived benefits to society and political convictions are the drivers, a view 
endorsed by Raymond (2001) and Ghosh (2003). We map incentives from these two 
disparate paradigms in order to determine what guides the contribution behaviors in open 
source. 
Our second aim is to empirically demonstrate the possibility that private returns 
and social considerations can coexist (von Hippel and von Krogh 2003). The “private-
collective” model of innovation may provide an alternative way to explain motives in 
open source development, which neither conventional innovation models can do (von 
Hippel and von Krogh, 2003).   
Third, the impact of the different incentives on the output of innovation is yet to 
be shown. In this paper, we examine the effect of different incentives on three dimensions 
of  new  product  performance—product  quality,  product  creativity  and  product 
development speed—in the context of open source development. We propose that the 
success of new product development will critically depend on striking the right balance 
between private investment incentives and collective action incentives.   3 
We  collect  and  analyze  primary  data  from  a  cross-section  of  open  source 
developers using web surveys to elicit their incentives behind open source contribution as 
well  as  their  assessment  of  product  performance.  Our  findings  suggest  that  at  the 
individual level, open source contributors are mainly guided by private level incentives 
while  at  the  aggregate  level,  the  output  of  innovation  is  mainly  guided  by  social 
considerations. Specifically, such motives as contributing to society and undermining the 
power  of  large  software  houses  have  a  positive  and  significant  influence  on  product 
quality, creativity, and speed of product development  
Our  work  joins  a  few  studies  in  the  recent  literature  that  focus  on  empirical 
research  into  the  motives  behind  open  source  development  (e.g.,  Hars  and  Ou  2002; 
Hertel et al 2003; Kogut and Metiu 2001; Lakhani and von Hippel 2000). The incentives 
we examine are  consistent with those investigated in the literature. Some researchers 
touch upon the quality aspects of open source products (e.g., Stamelos et al. 2002; Zhao 
and Elbaum 2003), but no one has comprehensively investigated the connection between 
open source product performance metrics and contribution behavior. We aim to fill this 
lacuna.  
The study proceeds as follows. First, we briefly review the literature and the 
theoretical background for an integrated private-collective incentive model of innovation. 
Then, we examine the effect of incentives on open source developers’ contributions. 
Next, we examine how these incentives influence the three dimensions of product 
performance—product quality, product creativity and speed of product development. The 
methodology and empirical findings of the study follow.  Lastly, limitations of the study 
and future research opportunities are discussed. 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Incentives behind the Private Investment Model of Innovation 
The seminal works of Lerner and Tirole (2001, 2002) advocate rational economic 
behavior as the main motive in open source development. In particular, they claim that 
programmers signal their ability to potential employers by contributing to open source 
code. In other words, contributions are made with the expectation of future monetary 
rewards. Dwyer (1999) similarly suggests that contributors are motivated by rewards in 
the form of higher income that results from the effects of reputation. Hann, Roberts,   4 
Slaughter, and Fielding (2002) maintain that some connection between salary and the 
rank of the contributors is possible, but no relationship between number of submissions 
(of program code) and salary has been found.  A more direct monetary reward can be 
realized by developers who serve as consultants to their contributed code (Anez 1999; 
Bhattacharjee et al. 2001). 
Expectations  of  future monetary  reward  are  clearly  not  the  only  driving  force 
behind open source contributions. Even advocates of selfish motives readily acknowledge 
the possibility of non-monetary considerations. Lerner and Tirole (2002) offer a possible 
complementary  motive  in  the  form  of  ego  gratification,  that  is,  the  desire  for  peer 
recognition. This view is shared by Raymond (2001, p. 64): “The utility function Linux 
hackers are maximizing is not classically economic, but is the intangible of their own ego 
satisfaction and reputation among other hackers.” (Raymond 2001). Also in the personal-
fulfillment category are mere enjoyment and personal needs (e.g., Ghosh 1998; O’Reilly 
1998; Raymond 2000). 
 
2.2 Incentives behind the Collective Action Model 
In sharp contrast to the private motives view, Raymond (2001) likens the open 
source community to a gift culture, which suggests that altruism is one of the largest 
motives for contribution. The notion that people take pleasure in doing good is as old as 
economics itself: “How selfish so ever man may be supposed to be, there are evidently 
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fate of others, and render their 
happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of 
seeing  it.”  (Smith  1759,  pt.  1,  section  1)  Attributed  to  Becker  (1974)  and  Harsanyi 
(1978), the basic altruism model simply implies in this context that the utility of open 
source  programmers  is  increasing  in  both  their  own  monetary  payoff  and  others’ 
monetary payoffs. Such behavior is also termed “pure altruism” (Andreoni 1990; Dawes 
and Thaler 1988). In contrast, the notion of “impure altruism” (Andreoni 1990; Dawes 
and Thaler 1988) suggests a warm glow that comes with “doing the right thing”. Impure 
altruism  is  generally  described  as  satisfaction  of  conscience  or  of  non-instrumental 
ethical mandates (Dawes and Thaler 1988).   5 
Altruism may not be independent of distributional concerns. To the extent that 
regard  for  others  depends  on  the  distribution  of  benefits  from  the  software,  we  may 
classify it as “fairness considerations”. Haruvy, Prasad, and Sethi (2002) posit fairness or 
equity considerations as the main set of motives that govern the behavior of open source 
contributors. As evidence, they discuss the outrage of the open source community at Red 
Hat for charging exorbitant prices for software, specifically Linux and Apache.
1 Marwell 
and Ames (1981), Kim and Walker (1984), and Isaac, McCue, and Plott (1985) find that 
people pay close attention to equity in public good contribution settings and that such 
behavior generates more socially efficient outcomes.  
Political  and  social  considerations  have  been  observed  to  be  critical  (Ghosh, 
2003). In particular, the desire to limit the power of large software companies and to 
promote the free flow and exchange of ideas has been at the forefront of the open source 
movement. The GNU manifesto, the defining document of the open source movement, 
lists  social  and  political  ideas  as  motivators  for  open  source  software  development. 
Ghosh (2003) finds that the majority of open source programmers tend to regard political 
and social consciousness as critical motives in their decision to contribute to open source 
code. 
 
2.3 An Integrated “Private-Collective” Model of Innovation 
The open source Model deviates from the two traditional models of innovations in 
several ways (von Hippel and von Krogh 2003). In the private investment model, the key 
factor  is  the  link  between  private  investment  and  private  returns.  In  the  open  source 
model, the lack of direct payment to contributors and the free dissemination of code make 
the connection between contribution and returns somewhat obscure. Less direct private 
rewards  to  the  developer  are  nevertheless  feasible.  Consulting  opportunities,  job 
prospects  and  the  possibility  of  promotion  and  pay  raise  may  result  from  prominent 
contributions to open source. Another private reward is self-gratification. 
In the collective action model, developers work together and split the rewards. 
The main advantage is greater efficiency and collaboration, but the major risk is free 
                                                 
1 Red Hat is a distribution of LINUX (a UNIX-type command line interface created by Linus Torvalds) for 
which users pay, as opposed to distributions of LINUX like Debian, which are free to install.   6 
riding by people who collect the rewards without putting in the effort. Typically, strong 
social relationships allow the group to punish free riding within itself. The collaboration 
in open source development is on a far greater scale than in the traditional collective 
model, however, free riding is virtually assured. Nevertheless, open source development 
continues  despite  evidence  of  users  who  are  not  developers,  and  it  appears  that 
contributors actually regard free riders as an asset (von Hippel and von Krogh 2003). 
There are several possible explanations for this seeming contradiction. As stated 
above, there may be an indirect compensation mechanism whereby developers can be 
distinguished from non-developers, and private returns can be awarded indirectly. Also, 
“free riders” in the open source context may be regarded more accurately as lower-level 
contributors, who typically help in debugging and provide feedback.  A third possibility 
is that social returns are somewhat broader in open source development than typically 
encountered in the traditional collective action model. Namely, we argue that in the open 
source context collective considerations are more of a socially benevolent and politically 
oriented  nature,  which  is  consistent  with  the  social  enforcement  of  the  traditional 
collective action model but transcends small group interaction. 
In order to determine what guides open source development, we examine the 
effects of four different incentives on developers’ contributions and the output of 
innovation. Two are from the private investment model: monetary reward and self-
fulfillment. The other two are from the collective action model, perceived benefits to 
society and political convictions. By examining the incentives and their influence at both 
the individual developers’ level and the aggregate innovation output level, we aim to 
provide insights that may be helpful to programmers, managers, and policy makers who 
work in or with the software industry. 
3. Individual Developers’ Contributions 
  We  first  examine  the  relationship  between  incentives  and  the  contributions  of 
individual  developers.  Individual  contribution  is  conceptualized  as  a  developer’s 
assessment of his or her efforts and productivity in open source software development.   
   7 
3.1 Private Incentives  
Under private incentives, we examine both monetary and non-monetary motives. 
Monetary motives are connected to direct or indirect future financial payoffs, such as job 
prospects,  promotion,  and  salary  increases.  Self-fulfillment,  a  non-monetary  private 
incentive, is defined as the personal gratification gained from working on an open source 
project, such as enjoyment and an elevated reputation.   
           Our  monetary  rewards  component  follows  directly  from  Lerner  and  Tirole’s 
(2002) career concern incentive. Even when there is no immediate monetary payoff, the 
potential  for  future  financial  compensation  can  be  a  key  factor  for  developers’ 
contributions  to  open  source  development.  The  future  financial  payoff  includes  the 
expected stream of returns over the programmer’s lifetime. Even though the programmer 
“volunteers his time for free,” the programmer’s contribution to open source can serve as 
a strong signal of skill among peers and future employers, which may result in better job 
prospects, higher future salaries, and more freelance consulting projects. Open source 
projects  typically  recognize  that  major  developers  and  programmers  often  list  such 
projects on their resume. These practices suggest a signaling explanation with monetary 
compensation as a possible goal. In signaling models, which began with Spence’s (1974) 
labor market signaling, an employer is willing to pay more for higher quality workers but 
can do so only if they reveal themselves by taking an action that is not optimal for lower 
quality workers.  
Spence  (1974)  proposes  that  workers  can  signal  their  quality  by  the  level  of 
education  they  pursue.  In  essence  the  cost  (disutility)  of  education  is  negatively 
correlated  with  ability,  such  that  the  more  capable  individuals  expend  less  effort  on 
education than less capable individuals. In a separating equilibrium, less able individuals 
do not find it profitable to signal (i.e. – pursue a high level of education), as the cost of 
education  for  them  exceeds  the  potential  gain  in  wage.  Therefore,  the  equilibrium 
outcome comprises high quality workers receiving a higher level of education (thereby 
signaling their type) and higher wages and the low ability workers receiving a lower level 
of education and lower wages. The same paradigm applies to the signaling of ability in 
the job market for programmers. If software developers and prospective employers have 
common  knowledge  regarding  the  presence  of  a  separating  equilibrium,  then  the   8 
credentials of open source contribution would serve to signal high programming ability. 
The  signaling  incentive  would  encourage  open  source  contributions  from  prospective 
employees, if only to reveal their programming abilities (Dwyer 1999; Lerner and Tirole 
2002).  
 
Hypothesis 1: A higher perceived monetary leads to increased contributions to 
open source projects.  
 
Monetary rewards are not the only private incentives that may influence open 
source contributions. Linus Torvalds wrote the core of Linux, which is possibly the most 
popular open source project to date. When he was asked why he released his work, he 
replied that initially it was an act of self-fulfillment; a sense of pride in what he had 
accomplished. (Ghosh1998). Raymond (2001, p. 32) alludes to this motivation of open 
source contributors when he states that “every good work of software starts by scratching 
a developer's personal itch.”  That is, one aspect of self-fulfillment is defined as mere 
enjoyment or a personal need.  
Other studies (Lovio-George 1992; Graham and Unruh 1990) show that, aside 
from direct monetary rewards, workers attribute their productivity to such rewards as a 
“pat on the back,” which provides satisfaction. Ego gratification — the desire for peer 
recognition— is proposed as a major incentive by Lerner and Tirole (2002) and Raymond 
(2001).  We  refer  collectively  to  these  two  sets  of  incentives  (enjoyment  and  ego 
gratification) as self-fulfillment, or personal non-monetary benefit. In addition, Bergquist 
and  Ljungberg  (2001)  argue  that  gift-giving  is  the  foundation  of  open  source 
development. New ideas and prototypes are freely given away for peers to review and 
circulate, which is one way to guarantee the quality of the code. In the digital community, 
this type of gift-giving behavior also can reward the giver with a certain amount of fame 
and respect.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Greater perceived self-fulfillment leads to increased contributions 
to open source projects. 
   9 
3.2 Collective Incentives 
The  collective  incentives  examined  here  are  perceived  benefits  to  society  and 
political convictions of the developers. Perceived benefits to society refer to motivations 
that are linked to altruism and social responsibility, that is, contributions to the “common 
good.”  Political  convictions  refer  to  a  developer’s  belief  in  collectivizing  in  order  to 
promote  societal  goals  such  as  free  competition  and  the  limited  power  of  large 
corporations.  These  two  sets  of  incentives  are  rooted  in  the  collective  action  model, 
which is centered on altruism. Limiting the power of major software companies (political 
convictions), exchanging knowledge (reciprocity), providing more software variety for 
users (altruism) and engendering new forms of cooperation (community building), can be 
important motives for contributors.  
Altruism, reciprocity, a collaborative spirit and political convictions have long 
been cited as important reasons for the growth of the open source movement. Ghosh 
(2003) found that a large member of the open source contributors he surveyed cited non-
selfish reasons as motivating factors. Raymond (2001) believes social considerations are 
crucial  in  the  development  of  the  open  source  community.  If  developers  think  their 
efforts will benefit society as a whole, they are more likely to contribute to a project and 
share code with others. Such benevolent behavior can complement other motivations for 
the open source development. 
Hypothesis 3: A greater perceived benefit to society leads to increased 
contribution to open source projects. 
 
In  addition  to  concern  for  the  welfare  of  society,  a  programmer  may  believe 
strongly in the open source paradigm as a tool for community building and as a way to 
mitigate of the power of large software companies.  We would expect these political 
convictions to positively and significantly affect the desire to contribute to open source 
projects. Such convictions and a concern for society are not mutually exclusive. Strong 
political convictions generally arise from the belief that a particular legal, economic, or 
social structure would benefit society. The difference between the two sets of incentives 
lies in the indirect nature of political convictions as compared to a direct desire to benefit 
society. Thus, a programmer who is motivated primarily by political considerations may   10 
want a change in the social order (e. g., less power for corporate giants or greater social 
equity) which he believes will lead to greater social welfare.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Strong political convictions lead to increased contributions to open 
source projects. 
 
These four categories of incentives may not cover all the motives that drive programmers. 
Humans are motivated by a complex web of social, environmental, physical, and other 
factors that are beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless the private and  collective 
dimensions encompass the main schools of thought regarding the incentives of open 
source contributors and can provide critical insights to the administration and 
organization of open source projects. 
 
4. Open Source Product Development 
 
An  understanding  of  what  makes  contributors  tick  is  critical  to  designing 
incentives for the open source community, but uncovering the link between incentives 
and different parameters of product development is equally crucial for the viability and 
future success of open source development. The general consensus among open source 
advocates is that this paradigm tends to result in software of better quality and higher 
reliability.  When  the  source  code  is  open,  users  as  well  as  developers  are  actively 
involved in testing, reporting, and debugging the product (Economist 2001). Raymond 
(1999, p. 41) states that “given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.” Nevertheless, 
there are concerns about open source product quality, and there is a lack of empirical 
evidence and validation on whether open source products perform better than proprietary 
software (Stamelos et al., 2002). One objective of our study is to explore this important 
aspect.  
We examine the link between the incentives to contribute and various dimensions 
of  product  development.  The  incentives,  monetary  and  non-monetary,  may  not  affect 
product development and individual contributions in the same way. If we detect strong 
relationships  between  certain  incentives  and  product  development  within  a  software   11 
process,
2 then we can recommend administrative policy with regard to incentive structure 
for programmers. This would be especially useful for open source development that takes 
place in commercial software firms.
3 Based on the new product development literature 
(e.g., Griffin 1993, 1997; Moorman 1995; Sarin and Mahajan 2001; Sethi 2000) and 
research on software performance metrics (e.g. Krishnan et al., 2000; Harter et al., 2000), 
our focus is on examining three characteristics of open source product development—
product quality, product creativity and product development speed.  
The  literature  views  product  quality  and  development  speed  as  two  important 
measures of software product development. According to Dekleva and Drehmer (1997), 
software processes are improved by such work practices as training, quality assurance, 
measurement, and design and code reviews. Krishnan et al. (2000) identify and utilize 
several metrics of productivity and quality of a software development process: size of 
code, quality, life-cycle productivity, usage of tools, personnel capability and front end 
resources.  Boehm’s  (1981)  COnstructive  COst  MOdel  (COCOMO)  for  software  cost 
estimation examines the relationship between development time and contribution effort: 
time declines exponentially with an increase in contribution effort. This suggests that 
development speed may rise with an increased level of contribution. Harter et al. (2000) 
employ  measures  similar  to  Krishnan  et  al.  (2000)  and  investigate  the  relationship 
between software process maturity, quality, cycle time, and effort. They find that a higher 
level of software process maturity is associated with higher quality, reduced cycle time, 
and greater effort.     
Technology-savvy users can enhance product quality in the open source sphere in 
a manner unrivaled by proprietary software. Their suggestions can lead to improvements 
in quality unattainable by standard debugging alone. Support for using this measure is 
provided by the Asundi et al. (2002) study of the Apache web server, which finds a large 
number of Apache users willing to report bugs in a structured manner as compared to 
commercial software development. Furthermore, Ljungberg (2000, p. 208) confirms that 
open source software often attains a “quality that outperforms commercial proprietary 
                                                 
2 A software process is a set of defined procedures that lead to the development of software products. 
(Zahran, 1998). 
3 JIKES, BSF, JFS and DPCL projects sponsored by IBM, the Darwin project by Apple Computers and the 
Grid Engine project by Sun Microsystems are some such examples from where we draw participants for 
our study.   12 
software.” In addition, the high quality of open source software is often attributed to 
complete accountability for performance. Pavlicek (2001, p. 60) notes that in open source 
software development, “quality truly is job one when there is no corporate PR engine to 
come along afterward and gloss over your shortcuts.”  
Another  salient  characteristic  of  open  source  development  is  the  unparalleled 
speed of development when rapid information exchange occurs among tens of thousands 
of developers, users, and experts in various fields. According to Gilmer (2002), open 
source  code  evolves  quickly  by  incorporating  “best  of  breed”  technologies.  Hacker 
communities borrow the best ideas from other projects (which is not illegal for open 
source products) to develop a certain program in record time.   
We  also  examine  a  third  dimension,  product  creativity,  or  the  degree  of 
innovation inherent in a product (Moorman 1995; Moorman and Miner 1997). It indicates 
whether a product has the potential to meet untapped market needs or even create new 
demands (Olson, Walker and Ruekert 1995). Product creativity is one way to examine 
whether a product has a competitive advantage in the software world. The relationship 
between programmer incentives and product creativity is worth examining in the context 
of open source projects because innovation is a salient characteristic of open source as 
opposed  to  the  rigid  corporate  routines  of  traditional  software  development.  In  this 
vibrant community of voluntary contributors, the level of commitment may surpass that 
of employees who merely get the job done. According to Jordan and Segelod (2002), 
software processes today yield products of increasing creativity and innovation that raise 
productivity and have a broad influence on the economy. Accordingly, creativity and 
innovativeness have long been metrics in the literature for product development and are 
identified as key factors in the software process. Von Hippel (2001) regards open source 
programmers  as  a  user  innovation  community  sensitive  to  the  needs  of  others  like 
themselves  and  with  a  high  degree  of  skill  and  creativity.  They  often  come  up  with 
products  such  as  Apache,  which  routinely  outperform  competing  commercial 
counterparts like Netscape and Microsoft server software. Francke and von Hippel (2002, 
p.  1213)  describe  the  open  source  software  as  a  “toolkit  for  innovation”  whereby 
solutions  in  the  software  process  are  engendered  by  the  creative  output  of  the  user   13 
community.  Shah  (2003)  and  Hertel  et  al.  (2003)  believe  creativity  is  a  defining 
characteristic of the open source software development paradigm. 
Using  these  three  metrics  for  software  development,  we  detail  the  linkages 
between  incentives  and  product  performance  in  the  next  two  sections.  Whether  open 
source  development  can  provide  software  of  higher  quality,  developed  faster,  and  of 
greater creativity than proprietary processes will determine the viability and long-term 
prospects for this model. Next, we present our hypotheses regarding the linkage between 
the four incentives behind OS development and the three product performance measures.  
 
4.1 Private Motives and Product Development 
The use of rewards to manage product-related performance is documented in the 
context of new product development teams in the traditional organization (e.g., Sarin and 
Mahajan  2001;  Sethi  2000).    Outcome-based  rewards,  such  as  bonuses  linked  to  the 
profitability of a firm, have been shown to be positively related to product quality (Sarin 
and  Mahajan  2001).  In  open  source  development,  users  contribute  to  software  code 
voluntarily. Developers generally receive no immediate monetary rewards for their work 
(for exceptions, see Hars and Ou 2002), but it can serve as a strong signal of their future 
career potential (Lerner and Tirole 2002). This expected payoff can encourage users to 
contribute to open source software for the sake of their future welfare. 
 The nature of open source facilitates user involvement because lead users can 
play a key role in product development (von Hippel 2001). They can identify the need for 
innovations, and even help solve problems (Urban and von Hippel 1988; von Hippel 
1986). They are the key source for innovation (von Hippel 1986). Their effort to fix bugs 
and add new features to an existing program addresses their own needs (Hertel et al. 
2003) and enhances the quality of a product (Sethi 2000).  
Future  monetary  rewards  can  speed  up  open  source  product  development  for 
several  reasons.  First,  because  of  modularity,  widely  dispersed  developers  can  work 
concurrently on improving the program (Kogut and Metiu 2001). The modular design 
and  the  source  code  availability  allows  for  parallel  debugging,  which  leads  to  faster 
software evolution (Zhao and Elbaum 2003). User participation and peer monitoring can 
help ensure the reliability of a product while reducing the cycle time. Second, monetary   14 
rewards  may  help  spark  the  creativity  that  goes  into  a  product.  The  open  source 
environment encourages creativity as there is no strict hierarchical management structure 
to  suppress  unconventional  ideas  and  discourage  directions  that  are  not  immediately 
profitable. Developers are working for something that matter to them, and they enjoy 
doing it (Torvalds, 1998). Third, software creativity and innovativeness are determined 
by  the  amount  of  knowledge  acquired  and  assimilated  through  the  learning  process 
(Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). The open and informal environment of open source 
encourages rapid knowledge sharing  among developers who are working towards the 
creation of better quality software to compete with proprietary software.  
 
Hypothesis 5: A higher perceived monetary reward leads to (a) higher product 
quality, (b) faster development speed, and (c) higher product creativity in open source 
projects. 
 
The desire for self-fulfillment is likely to lead to creativity in one’s chosen form 
of expression. This self-fulfillment is augmented when a person can work on ideas that 
address his or her needs (Fischer and Nakakoji 1992). Most open source projects begin 
with  addressing  an  individual  need  and  thus  a  high  degree  of  problem-solving 
innovativeness is built into them.  Because the open source community gives a developer 
considerable control over the distribution of code, the creator of new software can share 
the code with other members of the community.  Doing so helps to create a climate that 
encourages a broad range of people to join in and find more creative solutions to the 
problem at hand (Fischer 1999). Thus, a desire for self-fulfillment in conjunction with the 
highly interactive open source environment can lead to creative answers to programming 
challenges.  This argument is consistent with the motivations posited by Raymond (2001) 
and Linus Torvalds, who developed the Linux kernel (Ghosh, 1998). Accordingly, we 
conjecture  that  self-fulfillment  is  positively  associated  with  open  source  product 
creativity.   
 
Hypothesis  6:  Greater  perceived  self-fulfillment  leads  to  higher  product  creativity  in 
open source projects.   15 
 
4.2 Collective Motives and Product Development 
As  previously  discussed,  developers  may  contribute  to  open  source  projects 
because of altruism, that is, they want to increase the welfare of other people in society. 
Developers motivated by altruism (among other possible motivations) allow the open 
source community free and unhindered access to their creative output. This benevolent 
act has obvious ramifications for quality control since other users and peers can test and 
inspect  the  newly  generated  code  (Bergquist  and  Ljungberg  2001).  Thus,  collective 
motives behind open source contribution may actually lead to an enhancement in product 
performance. Linux, which is one of the most highly regarded open source projects, was 
created because large number of Unix developers were unhappy that end-users relied too 
heavily on Microsoft’s proprietary server software, which among its other shortcomings 
was  alarmingly  vulnerable  to  virus  attacks.  They  wanted  a  new  system  of  higher 
reliability  and  security,  and  today  Linux  has  been  adopted  by  a  number  of  large 
commercial  firms,  including  IBM,  Apple,  and  Sun  (West  2003).  Therefore, a  “social 
orientation” can lead to the development of better software. Ghosh (2003) asserts that the 
need to collectivize in solidarity and subvert the power of large corporate entities plays a 
significant role in raising the level of software development.  
Since  the  open  source  environment  can  allow  for  code  writing,  testing  and 
debugging at the same time, this overlap in the new product development process can 
significantly reduce cycle time (e.g., Griffin 1993, 1997). Therefore, the same altruism 
that can lead to higher product quality also can result in shorter turnaround times for open 
source projects. 
The association between social motives and creativity is worth examining as well. 
We  conjecture  that  perceived  benefits  to  society  and  political  convictions  can  be 
conducive  to  more  creativity  among  open  source  developers  during  their  course  of 
creating a better product. As argued by Fischer (1999, p.10), a major challenge for social 
creativity  is  to  “allow  end-users  to  become  co-developers  of  systems.”  Because  the 
bedrock of the open source model is user participation, we argue that it is well equipped 
to overcome this challenge. Collaborative knowledge sharing, feedback in the form of 
bug reports, and a commitment to community building ensure that a more innovative   16 
solution to the problem is obtained through open source as opposed to a more proprietary 
development pattern (Fischer 1991).  
 
Hypothesis 7: A greater perceived benefit to society leads to (a) higher product quality, 
(b) faster development speed, and (c) higher product creativity in open source projects. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Stronger political convictions lead to (a) higher product quality, (b) faster 
development speed, and (c) higher product creativity in open source projects. 
 
5. Methodology 
5.1 Data Collection 
Data were collected by emailing 2000 programmers listed as contributors on open 
source web pages and on selected open source developer lists.  A second round of email 
was sent two weeks later. Respondents were assured of confidentiality and were given a 
brief summary of the proposed study as well as their roles as participants. Of the 164 
responses received, four were unusable due to missing values. A test for non-response 
bias was completed following the Armstrong and Overton (1977) procedure to detect 
differences in the means between early and late respondents. Based on the analysis, no 
significant differences were found between the sample groups on the variables of interest.  
 
5.2. Characteristics of Survey Participants 
Although we did not ask for nationality, the email return addresses represented at 
least 18 countries and five continents (North America, South America, Europe, Asia, and 
Australia). More than 90 distinct open source projects were represented (not counting 
modules as separate projects), of which the most common were Apache, Linux, Open 
Office, and Mozilla.   
Among respondents, 19% were self-employed and 11% were unemployed. The 
rest were employed by a firm. The level of education was relatively high: 21% with a 
Ph.D., 16% with a master’s degree, 31% with a bachelor degree, 26% still in college, and 
6% still in high school. The vast majority (74%) had more than five years of 
programming experience. Most had participated in the open source movement for more   17 
than five years, and the average was 4.7 years. The majority of respondents (52%) were 
involved in no more than two open source projects. Fifteen respondents had worked on at 
least ten separate projects, which brought the average to about four projects per 
contributor. Approximately 80% of respondents indicated that they dedicated no more 
than one or two hours per day to open source and 10.6% dedicated 5 hours or more per 
day.  
 
 
5.3 Measures, Reliability and Validity   
Relevant measures for the constructs were identified in the literature, modified, 
and refined according to information gained during preliminary personal interviews. All 
items were measured on 7-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
The respondents were asked to reflect upon a specific open source project to which they 
had contributed in the past year. Following Anderson and Gerbing (1988), we purify the 
measures by assessing the reliability and unidimensionality of each construct. We first 
examine item-to-total correlations within each construct and delete items with low 
correlations. We then subject the items to principal component analysis (PCA) and 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using EQS. During the purification, items that do not 
load heavily on the primary factor or those that have high cross-loadings are dropped. 
The CFA yield adequate model fit for the proposed factor structure (χ
2 = 642.962 with 
degree of freedom (d.f.) = 497, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.945, Bollen Fit Index 
(IFI) = 0.947, Root Mean Squared Error of App. (RMSEA) = 0.043). All items loaded on 
their respective constructs and are statistically significant. Furthermore, the Cronbach 
alpha for each construct is above the 0.70 suggested by Nunnally (1978), which indicates 
adequate reliability. Table 1 lists the measures used in the final study, the factor loadings, 
and construct reliability. Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 2.  
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
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6. Analysis and Results 
We first examine the ratio of unselfish (average of perceived social benefits and 
political  convictions)  and  selfish  motives  (average  of  monetary  rewards  and  self-
fulfillment). The results reveal that, in sharp contrast to the well-accepted selfish motives 
theory of Lerner and Tirole (2001, 2002), unselfish motives are far more predominant 
than monetary considerations.  Responses to the relevant survey items are almost without 
exception  clustered  around  the  high  end  of  the  Likert  scale.  Hierarchical  clustering 
methods reveal no more than one cluster of significant size for greater majority of the 
respondents (86%); the unselfish-to-selfish ratio is equal to or greater than to the 1.25 at 
the mode. Especially noteworthy is the bin immediately to the right of the mode, with 
27% of respondents, in which unselfish motives are 50% greater than selfish motives. 
 
 
6.1 The Relationship of Incentives to Individual Contribution 
We use a logistic regression to examine the relationship between incentives and 
individual contributions.  The dependent variable, individual contribution, is converted 
into a binary variable. It has a value of 1 for Likert ratings of 6 or 7, indicating a high 
level of contribution, and 0 for ratings 1 through 5, indicating a low to moderate level of 
contribution. As shown in Table 3, monetary rewards and self-fulfillment both positively 
influence developers’ contributions. Thus, H1 and H2 are supported. Contrary to what we 
expected, perceived benefits to society are not significantly associated with developers’ 
contributions and political convictions are negatively rather than positively associated. 
Thus, H3 and H4 are not supported. Although the open source community as a whole is 
known to espouse political and social convictions (Ghosh 2003), it appears that these do 
not influence the more active contributors. The negative association for political motives 
however does not necessarily imply that politically minded individuals are unlikely to 
join the open source movement.  
 
<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
 
To determine whether the open source community consists of two segments or 
subpopulations, we use the mixture model approach (Kamakura and Russel 1989), which   19 
allows all the parameters in the choice model to be heterogeneous. The Kamakura-Russel 
method adopted here assumes the underlying distribution of parameters to be discrete and 
is a special case of the random coefficient model, which typically assumes a continuous 
distribution. The advantage of this approach is that consumer segments may be identified 
(Briesch  et  al.  1997).  The  log  likelihood  from  the  two  segments  (-87.03)  is  not 
significantly  different  from  that  of  one  segment  (-91.28).  The  results  show  that  the 
populations of our sample are fairly homogeneous.  
                                        
 
6.2 The Relationship of Incentives to Product Development 
To  examine  the  effect  of  incentives  on  software  development,  we  conduct 
seemingly unrelated regressions (controlling for correlations of the error terms between 
the regression equations) to uncover some patterns regarding the effect of incentives on 
the  metrics  for  software  development  (see  table  4).  We  control  for  the  demographic 
variables  of  education,  employment,  and  the  degree  of  open  source  participation  to 
account  for  the  possibility  that  these  affect  the  contributor’s  perceptions  in  assessing 
product success. We also account for a product development stage and the perceived 
level of a firm’s expenditures in the regression equations for product quality and product 
development speed, but not in the equation for product creativity. Except for the degree 
of open source participation, which is significant only in the quality regression, none of 
the demographic effects are significant. The rest of the estimates are reported in table 4. 
 
<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
 
The  results  show  that  monetary  rewards  and  perceived  benefits  to  society 
positively  affect  all  three  dimensions  of  product  performance.  Thus,  H5  and  H7  are 
supported at the 5% significance level.  In other words, a perception of higher future 
rewards  and  the  desire  to  provide  benefits  to  society  encourage  learning  and  social 
creativity among developers. The result is a software product developed faster and of 
higher  quality  compared  to  the  proprietary  process.    The  coexistence  of  these  two   20 
incentives indicates common ground for private and collective motives in open source 
development.  
Self-fulfillment does not seem to have a significant influence on product quality 
and product development speed. It does seem to be significantly associated with product 
creativity however, as H6 is supported at the 10% level of significance. This result shows 
that individual creativity is channeled by the open source model, and it reflected in the 
higher  level  of  product  creativity  under  open  source  development.  That  is,  product 
creativity is enhanced as a result of the self-fulfillment obtained from generating code. 
Political  convictions  are  positively  associated  with  product  quality  and  development 
speed, but they do not appear to have any significant influence on product creativity, so 
H8  is  only  partially  supported.  In  other  words,  political  convictions  may  make 
programmers work faster and focus on quality, but do not affect product creativity. Thus 
product creativity has little to do with the intensity of the political ideology to which a 
developer subscribes. 
 
 
7. Discussion and Implications 
As open source becomes an increasingly common form of software development, 
firms  need  to  understand  which  incentives  will  enhance  the  productivity  of  their 
programmers. Managers of profit-oriented corporations have in the past been reluctant to 
harness the power of the open source movement, but today companies such as   IBM, 
Apple,  Sun,  Oracle,  Compaq,  and  Dell  are  increasingly  adopting  this  concept. 
Unfortunately, there are no clear guidelines as to the best way to manage incentives and 
reap the benefit from open source initiatives. 
Our  goal  was  to  provide  survey  evidence  on  the  motivations  of  open  source 
programmers  and  to  link  such  motives  to  both  individual  contributions  and  product 
development characteristics. Although motives stem from a mosaic of economic, social, 
and political realms, we have classified them into two categories—private and collective.  
Our survey of open source programmers reveals that such private incentives as future 
monetary rewards and self-fulfillment positively influence individual developers’ direct 
contributions. This finding is consistent with Lerner and Tirole’s (2002) proposition that   21 
selfish motives are the primary driver of open source contribution. A different pattern of 
motives emerges, however, when we map the connections between motives and open 
source  product  development  parameters.  Social  considerations  seem  to  dominate  as 
drivers  of  product  quality  and  product  development  speed,  though  monetary 
considerations continue to remain important after controlling for education, employment, 
the  degree  of  open  source  involvement,  product  development  stage  and  firm 
expenditures. With regard to innovation output, there appears to be common ground for 
private and collective motives. This is consistent with research by von Hippel and von 
Krogh (2003).   Yet, our results should be interpreted with caution. Although the survey 
responses are unequivocal, they may not fully reflect the strength of emotions. Quite a 
few  respondents  sent  emails  expressing  indignation  at  survey  items  which  suggested 
monetary  considerations  could  possibly  motivate  their  contributions  to  open  source 
projects.  
Several managerial implications can be derived from our findings. First, monetary 
incentives alone are not likely to result in successful software development in the open 
source realm. Attention should be paid to social considerations in order to ensure product 
quality.  In  firms  that  adopt  the  open  source  model,  managers  may  need  to  focus  on 
sources of productivity that traditionally have not been deemed very important.  
Second, it may be desirable to encourage self-fulfillment as an organizational goal 
for employees, given our finding that it affects product creativity. Accordingly, firms 
may need to place greater emphasis on recognition and praise for creative work.  
Third, political considerations appear the least consequential in terms of creativity 
but highly relevant for product quality and speed of development. Therefore, small firms 
might be advised to support the open source movement, emphasize a business policy that 
champions collaborative work processes, and avoid the intense employee competitiveness 
that  characterizes  some  large  corporations.    Major  firms  such  as  IBM  and  Apple 
Computers have also created communities of developers (projects such as JIKES and 
DPCL sponsored by IBM and Open Darwin sponsored by Apple Computers) within the 
organization that are relatively free of corporate hegemony and have a high degree of 
control over their product.    22 
Fourth,  it  appears  that  individual  level  contributions  are  highly  influenced  by 
monetary rewards although our survey reveals a critical role of non-pecuniary motives as 
well.  This  may  reflect  the  characteristics  of  our  sample,  which  is  composed  of  open 
source developers only. They may have decided to join the open source movement for 
ideological reasons and then became more interested in potential monetary rewards.  In 
other  words,  ideological  motivations  may  matter  more  at  the  time  a  person  decides 
whether or not to join an open source project, but diminishes in importance as he gathers 
more  open  source  programming  experience.  Future  research  can  incorporate 
programmers  who  are  contemplating  writing  open  source  code  for  the  first  time  and 
examine  their  decision  choice  of  joining  the  open  source  movement.  We  expect  that 
social considerations probably matter to a large extent in that decision.  
Fifth, the different patterns of incentives that drive individual contributions and 
the  aggregate  level  of  innovation  output  suggest  some  practices  for  managing  open 
source contributions in the corporate environment. At the individual level, we can put 
more emphasis on providing such factors as indirect future income and the need for self-
fulfillment  that  boost  the  developers’  contributions.  For  example,  give  a  developer 
responsibility for managing the creative output of a project, which would have long-term 
career benefits. . Also, enjoyment may be enhanced by creating a state of the art code 
submission and integration interface that gives developers the creative freedom, without 
bureaucratic  and  administrative  restrictions.  At  the  innovation  output  level,  because 
social considerations play an important role, it may be necessary to foster a sense of 
community,  emphasize  collective  behavior,  and  allow  for  a  wide  range  of  political 
orientations in order to promote   a creative atmosphere. 
The  results  of  this  study  provide  some  guidance  for  future  research  on  open 
source development. It has been suggested that a hybrid open source model may perform 
well in software development firms. Here the traditional software firm incorporates open 
source practices in order to better manage the software development process (Sharma et 
al. 2002). West (2003) examines three case studies in which proprietary software firms, 
such  as  Apple,  IBM  and  Sun,  incorporate  the  open  source  model  into  their  software 
development  platform.  Future  research  can  focus  on  such  efforts,  particularly  the   23 
appropriate  governance  forms  and  incentive  structures  that  promote  innovation  in  a 
hybrid environment of this type.   24 
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Table 1: Construct Measurement, CFA Standardized Loadings, and 
Construct Reliability 
 
Measures  CFA 
Loading 
 
t-value 
 
α α α α 
Product Quality      .893 
•  The overall quality of this OS product is better than that of competitors.  
 
.891  14.02   
•  The customers of this OS product often perceive this product to be better 
than competing products.  
.749  10.77   
•  The OS product meets customers’ needs. 
  
.767  11.13   
•  Compared to other competitive products, this OS product is of better 
quality in terms of its functionality.  
.797  11.78   
•  Compared to other competitive products, this OS product is of better 
quality in terms of its reliability. 
.781  11.42   
•  Compared to other competitive products, this OS product is of better 
quality in terms of its security. 
.578  7.68   
Product Development Speed      .792 
•  The OS product development for this product is faster than other open 
source software of similar nature. 
.586  7.40   
•  The OS product development for this product is faster than that of closed 
source software of similar nature. 
.822  11.28   
•  The OS product development for this product is faster than I had expected.  .727  9.65   
•  The cycle time for this OS product development is shorter than that of 
similar software in the industry. 
.639  8.23   
Product Creativity      .896 
•  Overall, this OS product is considered to be creative.  .716  10.01   
•  This OS product challenges existing ideas for its product category.   .688  9.42   
•  This OS product offers new ideas to its product category.  .772  11.09   
•  This OS product is considered to be interesting.  .812  11.99   
•  This OS product spawns new ideas for other products.   .779  11.26   
•  This OS product encourages fresh thinking.  
 
.804  11.80   
Perceived Benefit to Society      .787 
￿  By contributing to this OS project, I make a contribution to society.   .765  10.28   
￿  By contributing to this OS project, I make a contribution to the open source 
community. 
.852  11.71   
￿  This OS project benefits a large number of end-users. 
 
.681  8.94   
Self-Fulfillment      .821 
￿  I value highly the admiration and respect of my peers.  .802  11.15   
￿  I obtain self-fulfillment from open source contributions.   .610  8.33   
￿  Recognition from my peers validates my programming abilities.   .708  9.48   
￿  I feel gratified when my OS contribution is acknowledged.  
 
.777  10.69   
Perceived Monetary Reward      .853 
￿  By contributing to this project, I expect better job prospects in the future.   .910  13.44   
￿  By contributing to this project, I expect an increase in future salary.  .787  11.08     30 
￿  By contributing to this project, I am more likely to get freelance consulting 
jobs.  
.718  9.86   
Political Convictions      .765 
•  Large software companies should not have as much power as they currently 
have.  
.593  7.52   
•  OS development promotes free and fair competition. 
 
.710  9.91   
•  The presence of a large OS community such as this one helps in limiting 
the power of large software companies. 
.825  11.35   
•  The presence of an OS community has given rise to more freedom and 
innovation in this project than there would be in proprietary software. 
.602  7.66   
Developers’ Contributions      .882 
•  I contributed a high volume of code to this open source project.  
 
.779  11.44   
•  I invested a large share of my time on this open source project. 
 
.904  14.32   
•  I exerted a great deal of effort in making contributions to this open source 
project 
.919  14.71   
•  Relative to other open source projects out there, I contributed more to this 
specific project. 
.634  8.66   
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.945; Bollen Fit Index (IFI)=0.947, 
Root Mean Squared Error of App. (RMSEA)=0.043,  
χ
2 = 642.962 with d.f. = 497. 
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Table 2: Mean, Standard Deviation, and Correlation of the Constructs Used in the Study 
 
  Correlations 
Constructs  Mean  Std  V1  V2  V3  V4  V5  V6  V7  V8 
Product Quality (V1)  32.64  5.91                 
Product Development Speed (V2)  17.61  4.61  .39               
Product Creativity (V3)  31.57  6.38  .43  .31             
Perceived Benefit to Society (V4)  18.31  3.23  .31  .25  .30           
Political Convictions (V5)  24.22  3.73  .25  .24  .13  .26         
Monetary Reward (V6)  12.61  4.20  .21  .15  .26  .08  -.14       
Self-Fulfillment (V7)  22.59  3.66  .20  .11  .27  .22  .09  .26     
Developers’ Contribution (V8)  16.48  6.44  -.01  -.07  .18  .02  -.28  .19  .15   
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Table 3: Relationship between Incentives and Individual Developers’ Contributions 
 
  Developers’ Contributions 
 
Monetary Rewards 
 
.29** 
Self-fulfillment  
 
.37* 
Perceived Benefits  
to Society 
0.01 
Political Convictions 
 
-.51** 
 
Log-likelihood = -91.276 
**p<0.05, *p<0.10 
 
 
Table 4: Relationship between Incentives and Product Development 
**p<0.05, *p<0.10 
 
 
 
 
  Product Quality  Development Speed  Product Creativity 
Monetary Rewards     0.34**    0.18*      0.32** 
Benefits to Society   0.28*    0.22*      0.55** 
Political Convictions     0.36**      0.29**  0.13 
Self-fulfillment  0.07  0.07    0.26* 
Development Stage      0.88**      0.47**  ---------- 
  Firm Expenditures   -0.001        0.002**  ---------- 